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In their recent volume The Patent Crisis, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue
that the patent system, as an undifferentiated catchall set of institutional rules
shaping all innovating sectors of our economy equally, fails to account for
significant variations in the nature of innovation and the needs of innovators from
one sector to another.1 Their remedy is not to propose an industry-specific patent
doctrine in response to the challenge of heterogeneity.2 In their own words, the
* MIT Sloan School of Management. Thanks to Dan Burk, Mark Lemley, and participants at the 2010
University of California, Irvine symposium “Bend or Break: Tailoring the Patent System to Promote
Innovation.” Other aspects of this paper have benefited from valuable feedback from the
Organisational Economics Workshop (Sydney), 2009 International Industrial Organization Society
Conference (Boston), and seminars at MIT, Northwestern, Stanford, Melbourne, and the Australian
National University. J.G. acknowledges an ARC Discovery Grant for financial assistance. F.M.
acknowledges a National Science Foundation Science of Science Policy Grant. Responsibility for all
errors lies with us.
** Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne.
*** MIT Technology & Policy Program.
1.
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
2. Some commentators have advocated legislative patent reform aimed at making technology-
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authors argue that “[p]atent law gives the courts substantial freedom to do this by
means of flexible legal standards we call ‘policy levers.’”3 They illustrate how, in
practice, patent doctrine inherently provides for a series of policy levers that
enable courts to produce significant variation in the precise ways in which patents
influence innovators across technical arenas and over time.4
This paper extends the Burk-Lemley perspective in two ways. First, it
illustrates how another institutional setting—the Republic of Science—also
provides overarching rules to reward knowledge production by a wide variety of
innovators by drawing out the parallels between the patent system and the
publication system at the level of an idealized doctrine.5 Through a detailed
example from protein crystallography, we then highlight how the publication
system has also been highly flexible in practice, illustrating the ways in which the
Republic (and more specifically the publication system) adapted to dynamic
scientific and technical changes. This allows us to understand the nature of various
“levers” that have enabled editors, reviewers, funders, and others to respond to
the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of innovation and, in doing so, to enhance
incentives, knowledge disclosure, and knowledge accumulation. By drawing
parallels between the levers in the patent and publication system, we support the
general approach proposed by Burk and Lemley and generate a set of implications
for how such flexibility might effectively be implemented.
Second, and more importantly, this paper illustrates how the two institutional
arrangements supporting incentives for innovation—patents and publications—
not only have significant parallels but also are intertwined in the ways in which
they shape the incentives for innovation, enable knowledge disclosure, and
promote knowledge accumulation. We illustrate this interaction and the
complementarities that arise using a simple economic model grounded in the

specific rules. See, e.g., S. Benjamin Pleune, Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the PTO to Properly Evolve
with Novel Technologies, 2001 U. Ill. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 365 (2001). Others have promoted other forms
of systematic change. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2006–07) (advocating the application
of administrative law principles to the patent system as a means to bring attractive change to the
system). Additionally, some commentators have advocated individual changes to patent law doctrine.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property,
69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002) (advocating that independent invention should be a defense to
infringement); John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251 (2002)
(advocating a patent system where multiple nonexclusive patents may be granted); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017 (1989) (arguing that basic scientific research can be protected by adding an experimental use
exemption to patent infringement liability).
3. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2003).
4. Id.
5. For the origin and meaning of the term “Republic of Science” see Michael Polanyi, The
Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1 MINERVA 54, 72 (1962). The term has been used
more recently in the new economics of science literature as illustrated by Partha Dasgupta & Paul A.
David, Toward a New Economics of Science, 23 RESEARCH POL’Y 487 (1994).
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negotiation between a scientist and a funder taking into account both the potential
competitive implications of disclosure through patenting but also the reputational
benefits for publishing as faced by the scientist. This model illustrates the key
levers from the Republic of Science that influence the level of patent disclosure
and the overall incentives available to innovators. The notion that these two
institutional arrangements are intertwined is then illustrated through two carefully
developed examples—HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and human
embryonic stem cells. In each case, reconsideration of key levers in the Republic
of Science—attribution of the inventive step, the nature of an inventive step, and
the required level of disclosure—by the scientific community not only shaped the
behavior and practices of scientists operating with the community, but also
influenced the ownership, validity, and strength of patents. Taken together, the
model and examples highlight the importance of broadening the context in which
we consider patent policy levers in such a way as to include those levers provided
for in the Republic of Science.
From a policy perspective it is possible that, by taking advantage of the pace
of change in the scientific community, we can more rapidly and profoundly shape
patenting and incentives for innovators via the Republic of Science than through
the courts. Alternatively, publication levers may serve to undermine patent levers
being enacted in the courts in ways that stifle the agenda set by those engaged in
shaping the patent system to reward and enable innovation. At the very least, key
patent levers designed to influence innovation in particular technical fields must
be considered in the broader context of the intertwined institutions of the
Republic of Science and the Patent System.
I. THE REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE AS DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE
A. The Doctrinal View
In his pioneering work on the sociology of science, Robert Merton provides
an overarching, doctrinal perspective on the scientific community when he posits
that the behavior of scientists is controlled by adherence to a set of norms:
universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism, originality, and
autonomy.6 This work has subsequently been extended including the classic
labelling of the scientific community as a “Republic of Science” by Michael
Polanyi who intended the expression to mean that the “community of scientists is
organized in a way which resembles certain features of a body politic and works
according to economic principles similar to those by which the production of
material goods is regulated.”7 While not as strictly observed or codified as the legal

6. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 550–61 (Free Press rev.
ed. 1957) (1949).
7. Polanyi, supra note 5.
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doctrines shaping intellectual property, and strongly criticized by later generations
of sociologists, Merton’s view provides a useful doctrinal foil in science to
intellectual property doctrine.8 Much like the doctrines of patent law, the Republic
of Science rewards the disclosure of new knowledge in publications and enables
subsequent credit allocation (the version of the disclosure that mirrors patent
disclosure and the rewards enabled through exclusionary property rights), and
could be explained by reference to these internalized values. While not the core
focus of Merton’s work, subsequent scholars, most notably Warren Hagström,
observed that publication with its exchange of knowledge in return for credit
reinforced the core institutional logic of science: the published paper is a gift of
information made in exchange for the hope of social recognition.9 Published
papers also are the mechanism through which social recognition is bestowed. The
contributor cites work that he found useful, thereby signalling the value of the
work of previous contributors.
In its idealized doctrinal formulation, the publication process has striking
parallels to the patent system: most papers receive reviews prior to publication
designed to adjudicate the basis of the claims, their link to prior knowledge, and
the extent to which they are indeed novel and considered a contribution. In
contrast to the patent system in which review is not blinded (and while the
scientific peer review process cannot be described as truly blind—most
knowledgeable reviewers in a given field know the work being done in the labs of
their peers), most academic science is subject to so-called “double-blind” review
and the very energy that goes into making the process appear disinterested serves
to reinforce this principle. The system has a variety of flaws (some of which are
well documented, including the extent to which ascriptive characteristics such as
gendered names seem to influence single-blind review outcomes); nonetheless, at
least in the natural sciences, it is an extensive element of the system with clear
editorial guidelines and apparently widespread agreement on what constitutes a
contribution, i.e. an inventive step.10 Rules governing falsification of findings also
exist through the system of scientific retractions and associated mechanisms such
as the Office for Scientific Integrity at the National Institutes of Health; however,
jurisdiction over such false claims remains complex, with a scientist’s employer,
the journal, and the funding agency all potentially participating in the adjudication
process.
After publication, the value of any particular discovery is determined, at least

8. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Propriety Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, YALE
L.J. 97 (1987).
9. See WARREN O. HAGSTRÖM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (1965).
10. In the social sciences, the clarity of guidelines and what constitutes a contribution is more
controversial. See Joshua S. Gans & George B. Shepherd, How Are the Mighty Fallen: Rejected Classic
Articles by Leading Economists, 8 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 165 (1994) for an analysis of the case in
economics.
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in part, by the number of scientists citing the work in their own publications, again
reinforcing the autonomy of academic science. Indeed, in a striking parallel to the
patent system, for individual scientists, the incentive to publish comes from the
importance the Republic of Science places on originality and priority. Merton can
be credited with delineating how the fight for priority is the engine that energizes
the widespread disclosure of scientific results. Merton observes that the history of
science has been frequently punctuated by acrimonious and hard-fought battles
between scientists over who should be credited with a discovery. Considerable
institutional energy is put forth in determining the outcome of such priority fights,
signalling the importance of these claims not just to individual egos, but to the
functioning of the institution. Successful claims make scientists “owners” of
discoveries, receive credit and rewards for their findings—but at the same time
make this new information available to other scientists. Institutional insistence that
such claims be adjudicated fairly underlines the importance of originality. It also
motivates scientists to publish their results quickly to preempt the claims of
others.
Employers in academic science reinforce the importance of disclosure
through publication. Publication and its attendant status may be directly valued by
those who engage in academic science, but it is also translated by universities and
research labs into promotion and future resources to continue scientific pursuits.
Universities closely monitor the publication records and citation patterns of
scientists in their employ and base important career decisions on these records. By
premising career rewards (such as tenure) on disclosure through publication,
universities become virtual “outposts of disciplines” that give up many of their
organizational prerogatives in employment to the collective judgment of the
scientific community.11
By reviewing publication through a doctrinal lens on the Republic of Science,
we do not mean to suggest a Panglossian view of science and publication in
particular. Rather, the aim is to lay out the doctrines that shape the Republic of
Science in such a way as to clearly illustrate the parallels with the patent system.
Nonetheless, much like the patent system, the way in which novel scientific
knowledge is adjudicated, published, and rewarded is grounded not simply in
broad norms and rules but instead in the daily practices of academic scientists. On
a daily basis, scientists deal with a variety of sources of indeterminacy in the rules
of publishing and rewards, including the fact that the institutional logic of Science
11. See JOSEPH BEN-DAVID, THE SCIENTIST’S ROLE IN SOCIETY (1971). While closely
associated with university research, Open Science is also feasible (and profitably adopted) by private
firms, including many within industries dependent on the life sciences. See Iain M. Cockburn &
Rebecca M. Henderson, Absorptive Capacity, Coauthoring Behavior, and the Organization of Research in Drug
Discovery, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 157 (1998); Fiona Murray, Innovation as Co-evolution of Scientific and
Technological Networks: Exploring Tissue Engineering, 31 RES. POL’Y 1389 (2002); Scott Stern, Do Scientists
Pay to Be Scientists?, 50 MGMT. SCI. 835 (2004); Lynne G. Zucker et al., Intellectual Human Capital and the
Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 290 (1998).
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may be internally inconsistent (as Merton noted about priority fights, the norm of
originality conflicts with disinterestedness), and perhaps more importantly for our
purposes, that the terms of the exchange of knowledge for recognition are
underspecified (how much information in a given publication, what forms of
recognition, etc.). This lack of specificity on the one hand allows for the flexibility
and robustness of the system, enabling as it does high levels of variation from one
discipline to another in terms of what constitutes enough novelty for a publication
and variation over time as the tools and techniques of science render once
intractable problems that might have been the subject of an entire Ph.D. thesis
now solvable in an afternoon.
B. The Dynamic Challenge
The need for such flexibility is best illustrated by example. In the field of
protein chemistry, technical advances have changed the nature of a publishable
contribution. In 1964, Dr. Dorothy Hodgkin received the Nobel Prize for
Chemistry for her “determinations by X-ray techniques of the structures of
important biochemical substances” based on her work solving the structures of
penicillin and vitamin B-12.12 Max Perutz during the same period discovered the
structure of hemoglobin and together with John Kendrew (who worked on
myoglobin) received the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1962.13 In order to
complete their work, Hodgkins, Perutz, and colleagues all used Kendrew-style
“brass models at a scale of 5 cm/Ångstrom . . . . built and supported within 2,500
vertical rods arranged to fill a cube six feet (2 meters) . . . . Colored clips were
attached to the rods to signify electron density, and guide the building of the
model.”14
In her Nobel Prize Lecture, Hodgkin provided more insight into the
challenges of crystal structure determination from the vantage point of 1964. She
noted:
12. The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1964, Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes
/chemistry/laureates/1964/ (last accessed Mar. 11, 2011); see also Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin et al.,
X-ray Crystallographic Investigation of the Structure of Penicillin, in CHEMISTRY OF PENICILLIN (1949);
Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin et al., The Crystal Structure of the Hexacarboxylic Acid Derived from B12 and the
Molecular Structure of the Vitamin, 176 NATURE 325 (1955); Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin et al., Structure
of Vitamin B12, 173 NATURE 64 (1956).
13. The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1962, Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes
/chemistry/laureates/1962/index.html (last accessed Mar. 11, 2011); see also Hilary Muirhead & Max
Ferdinand Perutz, Structure of Haemoglobin: A Three-Dimensional Fourier Synthesis of Reduced Human
Haemoglobin at 5.5 Å Resolution, 199 NATURE 633 (1963); Max Ferdinand Perutz et al., Three-Dimensional
Fourier Synthesis of Horse Oxyhaemoglobin at 2.8 Å Resolution: (1) X-ray Analysis, 219 NATURE 29 (1968);
Max Ferdinand Perutz et al., Three-Dimensional Fourier Synthesis of Horse Oxyhaemoglobin at 2.8 Å
Resolution: the Atomic Model, 219 NATURE 131 (1968); John Cowdery Kendrew et al., A Three-dimensional
Model of the Myoglobin Molecule Obtained by X-ray Analysis, 181 NATURE 662 (1958).
14. Eric Martz & Eric Francoeur, History of Visualization of Biological Macromolecules, Physical
Representations, http://www.umass.edu/microbio/rasmol/history.htm#physical (last revised Aug.
2004).
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The experimental data we have to employ are the X-ray diffraction
spectra from the crystal to be studied, usually recorded photographically
and their intensities estimated by eye. These spectra correspond with a
series of harmonic terms which can be recombined to give us a
representation of the X-ray scattering material in the crystal, the electron
density . . . . One is then in the position that, from a sufficient number of
measurements, one can calculate directly the electron density and see the
whole structure spread out before one’s eyes. However, the feat involved
in the calculations described two years ago was prodigious—tens of
thousands of reflections for five or six crystals were measured to provide
the electron-density distribution in myoglobin and haemoglobin. More
often, and with most crystals, the conditions for direct electron-density
calculation are not initially met and one’s progress towards the final
answer is stepwise . . . . Our early attempts at structure analysis now seem
to be very primitive.15
Similarly, Kendrew in his Nobel Prize Lecture (in 1962) described how
Even at the first stage of the analysis we made use of an electronic
computer, EDSAC I, which though small and slow by modern standards
was at the time one of the very few such instruments in operation in the
world; it is significant that these early Fourier syntheses of the myoglobin
data were, to the best of my belief, the first crystallographic computations
ever carried out on an electronic computer and initiated a practice which
later (and incidentally after a time lag of several years) became universal
among crystallographers.16
It was not until the mid-1970s that researchers were able to solve a protein
crystal structure and visualize it computationally without using a rather
cumbersome “Kendrew”-style model—instead using a computer system
developed at the University of North Carolina.17 By the mid-1990s, both
commercial and freeware software became available to researchers for the
visualization of biological molecules on the basis of their underlying amino acid
structure combined with crystallographic data as well as the emerging use of
magnetic resonance imaging techniques. Over the past fifty years, “[t]he rate of
structure determination has accelerated mainly due to the introduction of new
algorithms and computer programs for diffraction data collection, structure
solution, refinement, and presentation.”18 Accordingly,

15. Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin, The X-ray Analysis of Complicated Molecules, in NOBEL
LECTURES, CHEMISTRY 1942–1962, 71, 71–72 (1964).
16. John C. Kendrew, Myoglobin and the Structure of Proteins, in NOBEL LECTURES, CHEMISTRY
1942–1962, 676, 680 (1964).
17. See Karl M. Beem et al., Metal Sites of Copper-Zinc Superoxide Dismutase, 16 BIOCHEMISTRY
1930 (1977); John A. Tainer et al., Determination and Analysis of the 2 Å Structure of Copper, Zinc Superoxide
Dismutase, 160 J. MOL. BIOL. 181 (1982).
18. Pavlina Řezáčová, Advances and Problems in Protein Crystallography, 16 MATERIALS
STRUCTURE k7, k7 (2009).
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[t]he data collection process with current X-ray sources, detectors and
computer software is one of the easiest and most automated steps in
protein crystallography . . . . The availability of many different protein
fold models allows use of molecular replacement for about half of all
structures currently deposited in the Protein Data Bank (PDB). Advances
in computer software for model building and refinement as well as
computer graphics allow for user-friendly and even automatic model
building and refinement. 19
The shifting technology of structure determination is reflected both in the
daily practices of scientists and also in their publications of this period. Take the
example of insulin: the first publications of the full structure came in 1971 after
several decades of work and a series of publications describing fragments of the
structure.20 By the 1990s, leading journals had shifted from publishing the lowresolution protein structures to, for example, a comparison of three different types
of insulin.21 Moving beyond insulin, it is instructive to examine the effect of this
shifting technology on the scope of answerable research questions and by
extension the nature of publications in the field protein structure determination.
In 1972, the advent of molecular cloning allowed for mass production of proteins
for structural studies22 and, in 1978, nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) was first
used as an alternative to X-ray crystallography.23 The combined ability to produce
large quantities of a desired protein and then determine the structure in solution
instead of in crystal form allowed for comparative structural studies as well as
investigations of more complex properties such as solvent interactions.24 Better
conceptual models of proteins, such as the development of the ribbon model in
1981, and continued refinement of then existing imaging techniques25 allowed for
the determination of complex structures such as those of integral membrane
proteins for which the 1988 Nobel Prize in chemistry was awarded.26 In fact, the
19.
20.

Id.
See, e.g., Margaret J. Adams et al., Structure of Rhombohedral 2-Zinc Insulin Crystals, 224
NATURE 491 (1969); Tom Blundell et al., Atomic Positions in Rhombohedral 2-Zinc Insulin Crystals, 231
NATURE 506 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Qing Xin Hua et al., Paradoxical Structure and Function in a Mutant Human Insulin
Associated with Diabetes Mellitus, 90 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 582 (1993).
22. See David A. Jackson et al., Biochemical Method for Inserting New Genetic Information into DNA
of Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA Molecules Containing Lambda Phage Genes and the Galactose Operon
of Escherichia coli, 69 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 2904 (1972).
23. See Gerhardt Wagner & Kurt Wuthrich, Dynamic Model of Globular Protein Conformations Based
on NMR Studies in Solution, 275 NATURE 247 (1978).
24. See Stephen Sprang et al., Solvent Accessibility Properties of Complex Proteins, 280 NATURE 333
(1979).
25. See Jane S. Richardson, Early Ribbon Drawings of Proteins, 7 NATURE STRUCT. & MOL. BIOL.
624 (2000); Johann Deisenhofer et al., X-ray Structure Analysis of a Membrane Protein Complex. Electron
Density Map at a 3 Å Resolution and a Model of Chromophores of the Photosynthetic Reaction Center from
Rhodopseudomonas viridis, 180 J. MOL. BIOL. 385 (1984).
26. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1988, Press Release,
Oct. 19, 1988, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1988/press.html.
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level of detail achieved in the 1980s allowed protein structure determination to be
accepted as a drug design tool to combat diseases such as HIV.27 With the
realization in 1990 that protein structures could be determined using a synthetic
amino acid, selenomethionine, through multi-wavelength anomalous diffraction
(MAD), the number of crystal structures determined in a given year increased
four-fold by 1996.28 This increase in quantity was complemented by an increase in
quality as more complex structures such as ion channels29 and the ribosome were
first determined in 1998 and 1999 respectively.30 In fact, both discoveries garnered
the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, with the potassium channel being recognized in
200331 and the ribosome in 2009.32 At the turn of the millennium, advances in
genome-scale studies in genetics led to the study of “structural genomics”; with
the goal of determining the three-dimensional structure of every protein in entire
genomes.33 In addition, continual refinements of existing techniques allowed for
more complex protein structures to be determined including that of RNA
polymerase in 2001,34 which was recognized by the 2006 Nobel Prize in
chemistry.35 The shifting technology of protein structure determination redefined
what constituted a publication in the field, both in terms of quantity and quality of
structures determined.
These changes are not, obviously, confined to chemistry. More salient to
those considering the parallels between the scientific system of publication and the
patent system are the changes in the nature of a contribution in human genetics—
a topic that has animated legal scholars and others concerned with the potential

27. See Manuel A. Navia et al., Three-Dimensional Structure of Aspartyl Protease from Human
Immunodeficiency Virus HIV-1, 337 NATURE 615 (1989); Michael Miller et al., Structure of Complex of
Synthetic HIV-1 Protease with a Substrate-Based Inhibitor at 2.3 Å Resolution, 246 SCIENCE 1149 (1989).
28. See Wei Yang et al., Structure of Ribonuclease H Phased at 2 Å Resolution by MAD Analysis of the
Selenomethionyl Protein, 249 SCIENCE 1398 (1990); Structural Biology and Synchrotron Radiation: Evaluation of
Resources and Needs, BIOSYNC (1997) http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome
/biosync/intro.shtml (last accessed May 21, 2011).
29. See Declan A. Doyle et al., The Structure of the Potassium Channel: Molecular Basis of K+
Conduction and Selectivity, 280 SCIENCE 69 (1998).
30. See Ante Tocilij et al., The Small Ribosomal Subunit from Thermus thermophilus at 4.5 Å
Resolution: Pattern Fittings and the Identification of a Functional Site, 96 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 14252
(1999); Nenad Ban et al., Placement of Protein and RNA Structures into a 5 Å Resolution Map of the 50S
Ribosomal Subunit, 400 NATURE 841 (1999); William M. Clemens et al., Structure of a Bacterial 30S
Ribosomal Subunit at 5.5 Å Resolution, 400 NATURE 833 (1999).
31. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2003
(Oct. 8, 2003) http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2003/press.html.
32. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2009
(Oct. 7, 2009) http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2009/press.html.
33. See Stephen K. Burley et al., Structural Genomics: Beyond the Human Genome Project, 23
NATURE GENETICS 151 (1999).
34. See Patrick Cramer et al., Structural Basis of Transcription: RNA Polymerase II at 2.8 Angstrom
Resolution, 292 SCIENCE 1863 (2001).
35. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2006
(Oct. 4, 2006) http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2006/press.html.
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ramifications associated with gene patenting.36 The need for dynamic
considerations is vividly illustrated by considering the scientific work that goes
into gene sequencing.37 In the 1980s, a graduate student might consider the
similarities and differences between two homologous genes in yeast.38 Fast
forward to 1986, when the first Applied Biosystems sequencer replaced simple
chain termination methods and could analyze up to 4,800 base pairs each day.
This and subsequent advances allowed theses of the early 1990s to encompass
complete genetic maps of organisms as complex as mice.39 By 2010, the most
recently launched machines sequence between 25 billion and 100 billion base pairs
each day.40 This is not to say that Ph.D. candidates in biology no longer have
research projects to accomplish, but rather that what once constituted a significant
and novel step towards scientific progress has now become highly automated,
with the novelty requiring the combination of significant amounts of data to
provide insights into the workings of individual as well as collections of genes.
Research in crystallography has come a long way from the era when the
painstaking work of understanding a single protein in a particular crystal form
took the course of a career. Today’s leading crystallographers, enabled by
technological advances, can “solve multiple structures of a single enzyme with
bound substrates, analogs, and products, to acquire a series of ‘snapshots’ of a
single enzyme.”41 Likewise in genetics, researchers who once published the
sequence of a single gene now must assemble complete genomes. Thus, we see
that just as the uneven nature of technical change across time and across
disciplines renders the doctrinal approach to the patent system challenging,42 so it
challenges the scientific community. Even when the core intellectual question
animating the field is stable, as in protein chemistry, the combination of
cumulative progress, together with technical advances requires that the definition
of a significant building block of new knowledge be a dynamic one. Less a
question of what is obvious or not, instead what is at issue is the depth of insight
and newly acquired information that constitutes a leading publication, the amount
36. See, e.g., LEGAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL (B.M. Knoppers, T.A.
Caulfield & T.D. Kinsella eds., 1996); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.
J. 721 (1990); John Murray, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHICAGO-KENT
L. REV. 231 (1999); Matthew Rimmer, Myriad Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing, 25 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 1 (2003).
37. See Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome,
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1213, 2010).
38. See, e.g., Peter Joseph Schatz, Analysis of -tubulin in Yeast (1982) (Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, MIT Department of Biology) (on file with MIT Library).
39. See, e.g., William Frank Dietrich, A Complete Genetic Map of the Mouse and its Application to the
Study of Mouse Models of Human Disease (1993) (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, MIT Department of
Biology) (on file with MIT Library).
40. J. Craig Venter, Multiple Personal Genomes Await, 464 NATURE 676, 677 (2010).
41. Catherine Drennan, The Crystallographic Approach, MIT DRENNAN LAB, http://web.mit.edu
/cld/research/crystallography/crystallography.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
42. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1.
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of information that must be disclosed and the form that will render it enabling to
those seeking to build cumulatively, and the appropriate rewards for that
knowledge. Consequently, the nature of disclosure and rewards in the Republic of
Science is dynamic. The mechanisms that allow the community to provide such
dynamic adaptation in light of these challenges and opportunities and the levers
that could ensure its responsiveness are of potential interest to those exploring
effective policy levers for the patent system.
C. The Practice View—Dynamic Adaptation
As a result of the ongoing desire to make their claim for and to maintain
professional autonomy, scientists have engaged in social action and boundary
work to define the distinctiveness of “science” and avoided the imposition of
constraints or practices from outside of science.43 Nonetheless, a variety of
scholars have argued that the “strong norms” (or doctrinal) perspective on the
Republic of Science is, in fact, more realistically understood as arising through
overlapping networks of epistemic communities whose own norms and practices
reflect the realities of laboratory life in all its rich complexity.44 Just as patent law
“gives the courts substantial freedom . . . by means of flexible legal standards”
operating at some remove from overarching patent doctrine,45 so the publication
system on the ground as enacted by scientists enables much greater discretion and
allows for dynamic adaptation to changing needs across disciplines and over time.
Serving as editors and reviewers, colleagues and advisors, scientists shape the
requirements and meaning of disclosure.
The successful flexibility of the Republic of Science, therefore, provides
compelling evidence to reinforce the view “that we should not jettison our
nominally uniform patent system in favor of specific statutes that protect
particular industries.”46 Instead “there are other ways the law can take account of
the needs and characteristics of different industries” in applying general patent
rules to specific cases.”47
Returning to our discussion of the dynamics of human gene sequencing
provides just one example of a community-wide but expert-based approach to the
dynamics of disclosure and enablement. Prior to the formalization of the Human

43. See STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1994); Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of
Science from Non-science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 781
(1983).
44. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 129 (1979) (quoting Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1579 (2003)); see also KARIN KNORR-CETINA, EPISTEMIC
CULTURES: HOW SCIENCES MAKE KNOWLEDGE (1999).
45. Burk & Lemley, supra note 3 at 1579.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1641.
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Genome Project by the Department of Energy and later the National Institutes of
Health in 1986, most human gene sequencing took place on an ad hoc basis with
only limited disclosure of precise sequence data even when sequences were
described in publications. However, as the project became more formal and the
need for full sequence information became more salient for rapid and effective
follow-on research, the community took steps to shape disclosure rules thus
facilitating enablement. In 1996, participants in the Human Genome Project met
in Bermuda for a large-scale sequencing strategy meeting for international
coordination of human genome sequencing, sponsored by the Wellcome Trust,
U.K. Medical Research Council. About fifty scientists from countries publicly
supporting large-scale human genome sequencing attended the conference.
Among other decisions it was agreed that:
 All human genomic sequence information, generated by centres
funded for large-scale human sequencing should be freely available
and in the public domain in order to encourage research and
development and to maximise its benefit to society.
 Sequence assemblies should be released as soon as possible; in
some centres, assemblies of greater than 1 Kb would be released
automatically on a daily basis.
 Finished annotated sequence should be submitted immediately to
the public databases.48
At the Second International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome
Sequencing in 1997,49 participants (participating organizations and funding
agencies) reconfirmed their sequencing data release policy and a set of norms of
“etiquette” regarding sequence claims:
 Mapping investment does not automatically entitle sequencing
claims over the same region until a sequence ready map has been
generated.
 Potential conflicts with other sequencers to be resolved by early
communication.
 Collaborations with groups with a biological interest in a region
should be subject to the same principles of data release and
communication.50
While less formally organized, the crystallographic community has also
dynamically updated its norms around data disclosure and sharing. In the 1960s,
“coordinates for individual entries had only been exchanged among a few research
laboratories using punched cards. Since each atom was represented by a single

48. “Policies on Release of Human Genomic Sequence Data: Bermuda-Quality Sequence,”
Summary of Principles Agreed at the First International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing, HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT INFORMATION (1996), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human
_Genome/research/bermuda.shtml (last visited May 21, 2011) [hereinafter HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT].
49. Held in Bermuda from Feb. 27, 1997 to Mar. 2, 1997.
50. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 48.
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card, an exchange of a structure the size of myoglobin required more than 1000
cards.”51 The idea of streamlining data sharing by developing a central repository
for protein structure data was first discussed at an American Crystallographic
Association meeting in Ottawa, Canada in 1970.52 Discussions among
crystallographers continued throughout the year and in 1971 after the Cold Spring
Harbor symposium on “Structure and Function of Proteins at the Three
Dimensional Level,” Walter Hamilton and Olga Kennard established the PDB
archive.53 Although there were only twenty-three entries in 1976, the
aforementioned advances in structure determination technology have allowed this
number to increase to over 66,000 in 2010.
As these examples highlight, the scientific community takes a broad set of
rules and expectations and tailors them to differences across fields and over time.
It does so using levers such as the publishing system but with adaptation relying
on a rich set of bottom-up interventions made by innovators—scientists—
themselves. These individuals not only work at the forefront of knowledge but
also take steps to shape the disclosure and reward system that lies at the core of
the scientific enterprise in such a way as to be responsive to changes at the
frontier. Rather than a single senior scientist judging the legitimacy of a claim for
credit, the level of disclosure, or the appropriate scope of an inventive step worthy
of journal publication, instead distributed groups of editors and reviewers, faculty
tenure committees, and granting agencies work to pull the levers of adaptation in
science. It is in the collective but distributed nature of these decisions that the
Republic of Science diverges from the patent system. Through careful application
of these mechanisms, flexibility is maintained so as to promote, rather than limit,
scientific progress and knowledge accumulation. The community has taken an
overarching view of the rules of scientific disclosure, a “contribution” and
enablement, and tailored them to specific conditions.
What might the parallels be for the patent system? While beyond the scope
of this paper, one might consider the role of scientific expertise in shaping
administrative review processes at the Patent Office.54 Recent steps in this
direction include the “peer-to-patent” process that opens the patent examination
process to the public for the first time. Started in June 2007, it is conceptualized as
using the wisdom of crowds to improve the patent review process, and as of May
2008, over 2,040 registered users had participated in the review of fifty-six patents
with 183 people submitting prior art references.55 With the permission of the
51. Helen M. Berman, The Protein Data Bank: A Historical Perspective, 64 ACTA
CRYSTALLOGRAPHICA 88 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., the recent work by Burnstein on the potential for administrative intervention and
review at the patent office as an alternative policy lever outside the remit of judges.
55. Community Patent Review, Site Statistics as of May 11, 2008, THE PEER TO PATENT
PROJECT, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/reviewerdemographics.html (last visited on July
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inventor, the program enables the public to submit prior art and commentary
relevant to the claims of pending patent applications specifically in the area of
Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security (TC2100). In July
2008, the scope was extended to include Technology Center 3600 (Class 705).
Accordingly,
[a]nyone in the public can participate as a reviewer, a patent application
facilitator, and by sharing information about the pilot with others.
Inventors can submit a qualified patent application for open review.
Public participation is crucial to demonstrating the value of openness and
making the case for greater USPTO accountability to the technical
community. A successful pilot will also make a case for expanding to
other subject matter.56
While quite distinct from the peer-review process or the editorial process
found in the Republic of Science, this particular initiative is suggestive of the role
of expert peers in enabling adaptation and tailoring of the patent system in such a
way as to meet the needs of different innovators.
II. INTERTWINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM & THE
REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE
At its most simplistic, the Republic of Science provides a parallel institutional
system for the disclosure of knowledge from which we might learn lessons or
draw parallels to guide our understanding of the ways in which the patent system
can adapt to the dynamics of innovation. However, this is based on the
assumption that these two systems are parallel but separate. As an alternative, we
posit that the two systems are intertwined in such a way that the levers shaping
disclosure in the Republic of Science also in fact influence the patent system.
To put it another way, by grounding our analysis of knowledge disclosure
only in the context provided by patent law, we fail to recognize another critical
influence on knowledge disclosure—namely the system of scientific publication.57

20, 2010).
56. Community Patent Review, About Community Patent, THE PEER TO PATENT PROJECT,
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/about.html (last visited on July 20, 2010).
57. In contrast, a much more extensive literature has examined the possible extent to which
the patent system influences the scientific community. Some scholars have focused on the negative
implications of the patent system on the scientific community. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Intellectual
Property: Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE 1110 (2004); Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989);
Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific
Knowledge?: An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648 (2007);
Murray et al. (2009) and Murray (forthcoming) for an empirical analysis that suggests that the
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In this section, we argue that the precise levers and adaptive processes of the
publication system outlined above not only shape knowledge disclosure in
publications; in areas where knowledge can be disclosed in publications and
patents, they also have a strong and significant impact on patenting. Therefore, by
placing the patent system into the broader institutional context of knowledge
disclosure that includes the Republic of Science, we provide a more complete
institutional picture and a more comprehensive set of practices that enable
adaptation to the demands of different innovators, solve some of the apparent
crises of the patent system, and enable some key facets of “industry tailoring” that
are less plausibly accomplished through patent reform. Indeed, the changing rules
and norms of the Republic of Science directly shape policy levers in the patent
system, including the degree and nature of patent disclosure—a point often
ignored by legal scholars and economists who more typically examine the
incentives for invention within the narrowly constructed boundaries of the patent
system.58 Instead we assume that disclosure decisions by innovators take place
within the intertwined institutional systems of patent law and publication norms.
This section illustrates these interrelationships with a simple model and two
empirical examples.
A. A Simple Model—Disclosure in Publications & Patents
At the core of the system of knowledge disclosure in patents is the
recognition that the cumulative acquisition of knowledge lies at the heart of
persistent economic growth. The fundamental spillover identified by Romer,
amongst others, was the fact that knowledge produced today increases the
productivity of the R&D sector in producing knowledge tomorrow.59 However, in
evaluating the incentives for innovation and disclosure, it is critical to examine not
only the patent system as the institutional setting shaping disclosure but also the
variety of alternatives available to a given innovator. Specifically, we lay out the
range of disclosure choices available to scientists (we use this term broadly to
include engineers and others engaged in technical work that might be potentially
disclosed in a variety of different mechanisms including the patent system). Our

influence of the patent system is negative in the short run but that the scientific community rapidly
adapts the nature and use of patents to enable continued scientific openness. But see David E.
Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005)
(contending that the patent system has not hindered biomedical research and other commentators
have not focused on the inherent technical barriers in the biomedical sciences).
58. Focusing on the historic literature, Petra Moser examines differences in patent systems
around the world and their influence on inventions in the Great Exhibition. Petra Moser, How Do
Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1216
(2005). The empirical economics literature is focused on the relationship between the patent system
and innovation. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin, A New Look at the Patent System, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 199
(1986). Similarly, the theoretical perspective is laid out by Scotchmer (2006) and prior papers.
59. Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990).
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approach is then to examine those factors (or levers, to use the language outlined
above) that shape the disclosure decision. To illustrate the subtleties of this choice,
we focus on the disclosure of scientific or technical knowledge generated as a
result of for-profit funding (though our approach can be extended to university
funding).60 The specific disclosure choices, as we will outline, are grounded both
in the range of institutional arrangements that influence disclosure and in the
negotiations that arise between scientists and those who fund them when their
disclosure preferences diverge.
To understand the range of disclosure choices available to innovators whose
knowledge is of potential scientific value but also a useful inventive step, consider
the following: disclosure of knowledge cannot be necessarily taken as a given
(although it might be a direct consequence of reverse-engineering when
knowledge is placed in the marketplace in the form of physical products). Instead,
disclosure is a choice made by scientists and their funders (call them firms). One
form of disclosure is, of course, the quid pro quo of obtaining patent protection.
However, we must recognize that obtaining a patent is a choice, especially when
such disclosures may be more harmful to a firm in the marketplace than would be
compensated by the protection a patent afforded. The other form of disclosure is,
of course, through publications. By publications, we do not just mean journal
publication but also presentation at seminars and conferences and through all of
the potential mechanisms afforded by the institutions of science. As noted above,
the incentive for such disclosure in this case is driven not just by norms requiring
this to be part of a scientific community,61 but also by the benefits of recognition
and prestige associated with being the first to discover a new piece of
knowledge—loosely called kudos. Yet a third alternative—at times posited as the
alternative to patenting—is of course secrecy, which could be an explicit choice
made by innovators in the form of trade secrets.62
As outlined in Section I, many discussions of disclosure and patenting allow
for a treatment of patenting and publishing as two entirely separate mechanisms.
Indeed, it is at times posited that patenting (or the alternative of secrecy) pertains
to useful knowledge while publishing (and the less frequently discussed alternative

60. What follows is an informal exposition of the formal analysis contained in Joshua S. Gans,
Fiona E. Murray & Scott Stern, Contracting over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property
Protection and Academic Publication, (Aug. 22, 2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559871.
61. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973).
62. See Richard Levin, Appropriability, R&D Spending and Technological Performance, 78(2) AM.
ECON. REV. 424 (1988) (Papers and Proceedings of the One-Hundredth Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987) (Special Issue on
Microeconomics); Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents: An
Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 (1981).
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of scientific secrecy) pertains to fundamental knowledge.63 Superficially, the choice
of publishing or patenting or secrecy arises as a conflict between scientists and
firms over disclosure. For the scientist, the kudos that arise from publication and
the citations that arise from knowledge accumulation direct them towards wanting
that knowledge to be published with whatever levels of disclosure are required for
the most prestigious journal in their field. But for the firm, use of knowledge can
imply imitative competition or a speeding up of entry that itself reduces the
commercializable length of their current technological lead. Thus, scientists prefer
more disclosure and ease of knowledge use while the firms would prefer the
opposite. Recall that patent disclosures are a cost of being able to enjoy the other
monopoly property rights of a patent and so are a contractual rather than a
voluntary act.
But, as is often the case, conflict of interest does not necessarily translate
into realized conflict of action when two parties are forced to cooperate: a firm
cannot easily compel scientists to secrecy (except under narrow conditions of
trade secrecy) anymore than scientists can assert their rights to free publication if
this would eviscerate any commercial return. Some negotiation must take place
that balances these competing interests. It is in the context of this negotiation that
the interaction between patenting and publishing is revealed. First, for knowledge
that arises in Pasteur’s Quadrant,64 in fact four rather than three disclosure
mechanisms are possible: patenting, publishing, secrecy, or (with the appropriate
timing of disclosure) patenting and publishing, sometimes referred to as patentpaper pairs.65 Such pairs are two documents—a patent and an academic
publication—that both disclose knowledge generated in the course of the same
project. Thus, whether or not patent-paper pairs are selected as the disclosure
mechanism, the patent system is intertwined with the system of scientific
publishing.
The interaction among the different choices and therefore the different
institutions can be strong and, in that respect, highly relevant for the design of
patent policy. The key issue is the extent to which the patent shapes the costs the
firm faces from publication of the same project and vice versa.66 To the extent
that a patent can perfectly block any entrant from building on the research with a

63. See Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Toward a New Economics of Science, 23 RES. POL’Y 487
(1994).
64. See DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (Brookings Institution 1997) for a definition. The explanation of
Pasteur’s Quadrant given here is taken from Murray & Stern, supra note 57.
65. Murray, supra note 11.
66. See, for example, Murray & Stern, supra note 57, and Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E.
Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193 (2009) for analyses on publishing and patenting. See Pierre Azoulay et al., The
Determinants of Faculty Patenting Behavior: Demographics or Opportunities?, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 599
(2007) for the determinants of patenting and publishing at the individual level.
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competing product, then disclosures (in publications) which otherwise might assist
such entry are not a cost to the firm at all. In this respect, perfect patent
protection eliminates the firm’s costs from publication (in competitive terms
without considering any time involved in preparing an additional manuscript) and
with it any conflict. Similarly, any moves to improve the ability of patents to block
such entry will have a positive impact on the expected degree of publication rights
afforded to scientists. Abstracting away from the case where patent protection is
“complete,” we can then understand the interaction among patenting and
publishing as arising through two levers: the difference in the disclosure level
between patents and publications and the difference in the type of disclosures
required for publications and patents.
To the extent that the level of disclosure required by an academic publication
is higher than that required in a patent, additional publishing by scientists will
provide a level of knowledge that could encourage or facilitate entry by others.
Therefore, we are likely to see fewer patent-paper pairs and a decline in academic
publishing relative to a period of lower disclosure requirements. Patents, of
course, have their own disclosure requirements. A first-order impact of requiring
patent disclosures to be greater and to be more like the disclosures found in
publications would be to reduce the additional costs associated with publication
itself. Having given much of the game away in a patent application, the firm’s
costs of letting scientists publish are consequently reduced.
Similarly, what arises if the disclosure overlaps between patents and papers
differ not so much in the level of disclosure but in the type of knowledge that is
required in one forum versus another? Overall, to the extent that the additional
disclosure requirements required by scientific institutions such as journals or
research centers are distinct from those required in the patent system, we would
expect to see less publishing and may see less patenting because the scope of the
publication may impact commercial returns. For instance, publication scope and
the provision of key scientific materials not required in the patent can influence
the ability of entrants to easily find work-arounds to the patent. Conversely, any
shift in patent disclosures more akin to those required in publications may enable
higher levels of publication. While not a direct interaction, indirectly the system of
scientific publishing can serve to shift firms and scientists into modes permissive
of patenting.
All this suggests that strong publications and a shift towards greater
openness in science, accompanied by a range of additional types of disclosure
including materials and methods, may be associated with a lower degree of
patenting and publishing despite the inherent conflict of interest between
scientists and firms on this issue. Extending beyond the narrow confines of the
model that focuses on the overlap in disclosure and the levels of disclosure, the
general point must be made that the adjudication of knowledge within the
Republic of Science itself intimately shapes the level, nature, and validity of
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knowledge disclosed within the patent system. Changes in the system of
publishing point towards changing norms in the scientific or technical
communities of innovators with which firms often engage and, thus, signal norms
of enablement that could be incorporated into considerations regarding patent
litigation. Likewise, adjudications of obviousness considered narrowly within the
scope of a given patent in a particular technical field may ignore norms of
obviousness emerging within the technical community where engineers are
educated, may collaborate, and certainly publish. Thus, again within a legal setting,
such levers of the patent system become strongly informed by norms emerging
from the Republic of Science. Two cases clearly illustrate this intimate
interconnection between the two systems—the disclosure and adjudication of the
claims of validity of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the claims of
inventiveness of the discovery of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs).
B. Patent & Publication Disputes over Human Embryonic Stem Cells
The case of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) illustrates the degree to
which one key lever of the patent system—obviousness—that might traditionally
be thought to have rested on narrow patent-based interpretation can also be
intimately linked to the adjudication of this issue by the scientific community. The
case begins as far back as July 9, 1981, when Sir Martin Evans and Professor
Matthew Kaufman published their discovery of “pluripotential cells” in mouse
embryos, a discovery that would earn Evans one third of the 2007 Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine.67 That December, Professor Gail Martin of the
University of California, San Francisco, published her independent discovery of
these cells and described them as “embryonic stem cells,” the name by which we
know them today.68 These discoveries were critical because embryonic stem cells
(ESCs) are pluripotent; they have the ability to self-replicate and differentiate into
any cell type.69 The scientific community quickly recognized this value, and by
1989, several research teams had used ESCs to create knockout mice, a technology
that proved to be essential for the biotechnology industry.70 Within a year,
techniques for isolating ovine (sheep) and porcine (pig) ESC lines were widely

67. Martin J. Evans & Matthew H. Kaufman, Establishment in Culture of Pluripotential Cells from
Mouse Embryos, 292 NATURE 154 (1981).
68. Gail R. Martin, Isolation of a Pluripotent Cell Line from Early Mouse Embryos Culture in Medium
Conditioned by Teratocarcinoma Stem Cells, 78 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 7634 (1981).
69. Evans & Kaufman, supra note 67; Martin, supra note 68.
70. See, e.g., Beverley H. Koller et al., Germ-Line Transmission of a Planned Alteration Made in a
Hypoxanthine Phosphoribosyltransferase Gene by Homologous Recombination in Embryonic Stem Cells, 86 PROC.
NAT. ACAD. SCI. 8927 (1989); Simon Thompson, Germ Line Transmission and Expression of a Corrected
HPRT Gene Produced by Gene Targeting in Embryonic Stem Cells, 56 CELL 313 (1989); Maarten Zijlstra,
Germ-Line Transmission of a Disrupted β2-microglobulin Gene Produced by Homologous Recombination in
Embryonic Stem Cells, 342 NATURE 435 (1989).
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known.71 However, it was not until 1994 that the Milwaukee Journal announced that
Professor James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s primate
center had successfully isolated an ESC line in primates.72 Thomson understood
that his success with primates (rhesus monkeys) meant that isolating a human ESC
line was not far off. Indeed, after the Milwaukee Journal story, he had a year (until
November 4, 1995) to file for a patent or let his discovery pass into the public
domain.73 The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF)74 submitted a
patent application in January75 and, three days later, Thomson submitted his
findings for scientific publication.76
The patent filed on January 20, 1995, by WARF (U.S. Patent Application
08/376,327) made “composition of matter” and “method” claims for primate
ESC lines and included three independent claims: Claims 1 and 3 were
composition of matter claims while Claim 9 described a method for isolating
primate ESC lines.77 The composition of matter claims were submitted as follows:
1. A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells which (i) is
capable of proliferation in vitro culture for over one year, (ii) maintains a
normal karyotype . . . through prolonged culture, (iii) maintains the
potential to differentiate to derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and
ectoderm tissues throughout the culture, and (iv) will not differentiate
when cultured on a fibroblast feeder layer. . . .
3. A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells wherein the
cells are negative for the SSEA-1 marker, positive for the SSEA-3
marker, positive for the SSEA-4 marker, express alkaline phosphatase
activity, are pluripotent, and have [normal] karyotypes.78
It is important to note that these claims cover ESC lines from all primates,
including humans. This makes Claim 1 very broad given that Thomson’s results

71. See, e.g., Jorge A. Piedrahita et al., On the Isolation Embryonic Stem Cells: Comparative Behavior of
Murine, Porcine and Ovine Embryos, 34 THERIOGENOLOGY 879 (1990).
72. Paul Raeburn, Embryonic Monkey Cells Isolated, MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 4, 1994.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2009).
74. It should be noted that the WARF, founded in 1925, serves the same function within the
University of Wisconsin system as a traditional Technology Licensing Office within other American
universities. Specifically, “The official mission of this private, nonprofit organization is to support
scientific research at the UW-Madison. WARF accomplishes this by patenting inventions arising from
university research, licensing the technologies to companies for commercialization, and returning the
licensing income to the UW-Madison to support further scientific endeavor.” Our History, WISCONSIN
ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=26 (last visited Mar.
6, 2011).
75. U.S. Patent Application No. 08/376,327 (submitted Jan. 20, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. Patent
Application ‘327].
76. James A. Thomson et al., Isolation of a Primate Embryonic Stem Cell Line, 92 PROC. NAT.
ACAD. SCI. 7844 (1995).
77. U.S. Patent Application ‘327, supra note 75.
78. Id.
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consisted primarily of rhesus monkey ESCs in 1995.79 Claim 9 details the method
for purifying ESCs and is as follows:80
9. A method of isolating a primate embryonic stem cell line, comprising
the steps of:
(a) isolating a primate blastocyst;
(b) isolating cells from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst of (a);
(c) plating the inner cell mass cells on embryonic fibroblasts, wherein
inner cell mass-derived cells masses are formed;
(d) dissociating the mass into dissociated cells;
(e) replating the dissociated cells on embryonic feeder cells;
(f) selecting colonies with compact morphologies and cells with high
nucleus to cytoplasm ratios and prominent nucleoli; and
(g) culturing the cells of the selected colonies.81
On January 17, 1996, the application was initially rejected.82 Susan Dadio, the
patent examiner assigned to the Application (08/376,327), initially objected to the
independent claims for “reasons of indefiniteness, and all the pending claims were
rejected for obviousness on the prior art.”83 Specifically, Dadio claimed that since
“there are some traits in common between the cells of Bongso et al.84 and those of
the applicant here, that the burden is placed on the applicant to demonstrate that
there is a nonobvious difference between the cells” and in turn justify the
composition of matter claims.85 Dadio also argued that “the functioning of the
applicant’s method in primates was predictable with reasonable certainty” because
of the success with similar methods in a wide range of mammals.86 While WARF
submitted a response to these critiques, amended the claims, and requested
reconsideration, the application was given a final rejection on October 29, 1996.87
However, WARF had anticipated this decision and already submitted a
continuation-in-part (CIP) application on January 18, 1996, the day after U.S.
79. See Jeanne F. Loring & Cathryn Campbell, Science and Law: Intellectual Property and Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 311 SCIENCE 1716 (2006).
80. It should be noted that composition of matter claims are generally stronger than method
claims because composition of matter claims cover the material itself irrespective of how it has been
created or how it is intended to be used. In addition, methods of production or isolation can easily
change over time in ways that make existing method patents obsolete. However, Claim 1 of this
application was so broad that even if a new isolation method were discovered, anyone who used it
would be infringing on this patent as soon as he or she possessed the resulting primate ESC line.
81. U.S. Patent Application ‘327, supra note 75.
82. Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment, U.S. Patent Application 08/376,327,
July 23, 1996, Nicholas Seay.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Ariff Bongso, Fertilization and Early Embryology: Isolation and Culture of Inner Cell Mass Cells
from Human Blastocysts, 9 HUM. REPROD. 2110 (1994);
85. Seay, supra note 82 at 4.
86. Id. at 6; see also Piedrahita et al., supra note 71.
87. Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application 08/376,327, Oct. 29, 1996, Jean Witz.
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Patent Application 08/376,327’s initial rejection, with identical claims.88
WARF’s CIP, U.S. Patent Application 08/591,246, was eventually approved
and published as U.S. Patent 5,843,780 despite being nearly identical to the
previous application.89 The only difference was that the first claim no longer
contained the assertion that a purified preparation of human embryonic stem cells
would “differentiate in the presence of human leukemia inhibitory factor alone,”
which was by no means the criterion for rejection of the previous application.90
While Examiner Brumbak initially rejected the patent on the grounds that the
application neglected to specify “the best mode”91 of the invention through a
“representative cell line,” WARF successfully argued that because the “procedure
taught in the specification [had] repeatedly yielded cell lines with the characteristics
cited in the claims”92 the “additional information about the testing which had been
conducted”93 should be used as an alternative to the specification of a single cell
line. Despite the examiner’s approval, the director of the patent examining group
sent a memorandum attempting “to re-open prosecution” before the patent was
granted.94 And yet, for reasons that seem more likely to be attributed to
bureaucracy than conspiracy, the memo failed to reach the issue control officer
before the patent was granted on December 1, 1998.95
Earlier that year, Thomson succeeded in purifying human ESCs for the first
time. Consequently, WARF filed for a divisional patent application specifying
human ESCs within the claims of U.S. Patent Application 08/591,246 just before
Thomson submitted his manuscript to Science for review, again making the
disclosure a patent-paper pair.96 WARF’s divisional application, U.S. Patent
Application 09/106,390, was initially and finally rejected because the examiner
believed the evidence provided did not meet the standard of “germ line potency”
for a cell line to be designated an ESC.97 However, WARF successfully appealed
the final rejection by arguing that the art accepted a definition of human ESCs that
did not include “germ line potency” because the ESCs described in Embryonic Stem

88. In general, CIPs allow inventors to incorporate improvements to their design during the
patent application process by refiling and associating the new filing date with all changes to the
previous application. However, WARF was able to use this mechanism to essentially refile the original
patent and see if a different examiner would be willing to approve it.
89. U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996) (issued Dec. 1, 1998).
90. U.S. Patent Application No. 08/591,246 (submitted Jan. 18, 1996).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2009).
92. Examiner Interview Summary Record, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/591,246, Jan. 22, 1998,
Brenda Brumbak.
93. Seay, supra note 82.
94. Memorandum, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/591,246, Nov. 19, 1998, John Doll.
95. Decision on Petition, U.S. Patent Application No. 08/591,246, Dec. 1, 1998, Karna Cooper.
96. James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, 282
SCIENCE 1145 (1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar. 13, 2001).
97. Non-Final Rejection, U.S. Patent Application No. 09/106,390, Sept. 24, 1999; Final Rejection,
U.S. Patent Application No. 09/106,390, Jan. 14, 2000, Deborah Clark.
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Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts, the article resulting from Professor
Thomson’s aforementioned manuscript, were considered to be human ESCs by
the peer reviewers and editors of Science without demonstrating “germ line
potency.”98 WARF was subsequently granted U.S. Patent 6,200,806 on March 13,
2001, and, in turn, commercial rights to all purified human ESCs until 2015.99
However, several important events in the history of hESCs began during this
appeals process.
Shortly after the 5,843,780 patent was issued in December 1998, WARF
licensed exclusive commercialization rights for cardiomyocytes, neural cells,
pancreatic islet cells, hematopoietic cells, osteoblasts, and chondrocytes to Geron
Corporation.100 WARF also created a nonprofit, the WiCell Research Institute, to
distribute human ESC lines according to the aforementioned licensing agreement
as well as future agreements.101 When Geron then attempted to exercise its option
to license up to twelve additional cell lines, WARF sued them, challenging Geron’s
right to exercise the option and implicitly deprive other researchers of access to
the additional stem cell types in light of President George W. Bush’s restrictions
on stem cell research.102 Before the trial, an agreement was reached in which
Geron relinquished its licensing option as well as its exclusivity on the commercial
use of hematopoietic cells, osteoblasts, and chondrocytes.103 In addition, WiCell
and the NIH signed a Memorandum of Understanding that gave the NIH and
NIH funded researchers at other noncommercial institutions access to WiCell’s
human ESC lines as long as they paid a “fee to cover [WiCell’s] handling and
distribution expenses in supplying these cell lines.”104

98. Thomson et al., supra note 96; Appeal Brief, U.S. Patent Application No. 09/106,390, Sept.
15, 2000, Carl Schwartz.
99. See Fiona Murray, The Stem Cell Market: Patents & the Pursuit of Scientific Progress, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2341 (2007); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar. 13, 2001).
100. Geron Corp. had funded much of the research carried out in the Thomson laboratory
under a sponsored research agreement with the University of Wisconsin; Brian Vastag, Suddenly, 64
Stem Cell Lines, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1163 (2001); Stem Cell Lines, GERON CORPORATION (2006),
http://www.geron.com/technology/stemcell/stemcelllines.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
101. Sander Rabin, The Gatekeepers of hES Cell Products, 23 NAT. BIOTECH. 817 (2005);
Meredith Wadman, Licensing Fees Slow Advance of Stem Cells, 435 NATURE 272 (2005).
102. NIH’s Role in Federal Policy: Stem Cell Research, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, (2006),
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/NIHFedPolicy.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2010); Antonio Regalo &
David P. Hamilton, How a University’s Patents May Limit Stem-Cell Research, WALL STREET J., July 18,
2006; Vastag, supra note 100.
103. Rabin, supra note 101.
104. News Release, National Institutes of Health and WiCell Research Institute, Inc., Sign
Stem Cell Research Agreement (Sept. 5, 2001). By 2002, the IP and research development landscape
around hESCs began to stabilize with the result that it was impossible to perform research on hESCs
without NIH funding or a commercial licensing agreement from either WARF or Geron. See Rabin,
supra note 101. In fact as late as 2005, the “handling and distribution” fee for an NIH-funded
academic researcher to use one of WARF’s hESC lines was $5000 and came with a non-distribution
clause, making it very hard for some junior faculty to acquire the cells. In addition, commercial
licenses ranged from $75,000 to beyond $250,000 in addition to annual fees and royalty payments and
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Throughout this period, WARF was pursuing another patent, specifically a
CIP of U.S. Patent 6,200,806, stemming from Thomson’s work on hESC cells.105
Although the claims in U.S. Patent Application 09/982,637 evolved significantly
throughout the review process, including the cancellation of all methods claims
due to “double patenting” concerns with U.S. Patent 5,843,780, the resulting
claims as approved in U.S. Patent 7,029,913 on April 18, 2006, are noteworthy:
1. A replicating in vitro cell culture of human embryonic stem cells
comprising cells which (i) are capable of proliferation in in vitro culture
for over one year without the application of exogenous leukemia
inhibitory factor, (ii) maintain a karyotype in which the chromosomes are
euploid through prolonged culture, (iii) maintain the potential to
differentiate to derivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues
throughout the culture, and (iv) are inhibited from differentiation when
cultured on a fibroblast feeder-layer.
2. The preparation of claim 1, wherein the stem cells will spontaneously
differentiate to trophoblast and produce chorionic gonadotropin when
cultured to high density.
3. The preparation of claim 1 wherein the cells are negative for the
SSEA-1 marker, positive for the SSEA-4 marker, and express alkaline
phosphatase.106
These claims furthered WARF’s reach by explicitly claiming ownership over
a sustainable “in vitro cell culture of human embryonic stem cells”—a
fundamental prerequisite for many tissue engineering and regenerative medicine
applications.107 By July 2006, over 300 academic labs and twelve private
companies had licensed hESC lines from WARF; but many in academia and
industry believed that WARF’s functional monopoly on human ESC lines was
unhealthy for the advancement of science and for the development of innovative
therapeutic companies.108 As a result, the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT) on
behalf of the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (FTCP), now called
Consumer Watchdog, requested an ex parte reexamination of every claim in U.S.
Patents 5,843,780 and 6,200,806 as well as an inter partes reexamination of every
claim in U.S. Patent 7,029,913 on the grounds that the aforementioned claims
were obvious and therefore should be not be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.109
potential equity agreements. See Wadman, supra note 101; Regalo & Hamilton, supra note 102.
105. U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (issued Apr. 18, 2006).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Loring & Campbell, supra note 79; Regalo & Hamilton, supra note 102.
109. Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780, July 18, 2006, Daniel B.
Ravicher, http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/warfstemcell/780Request.pdf; Request for Ex Parte
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806, July 18, 2006, Daniel B. Ravicher, http://www.pubpat.org
/assets/files/warfstemcell/806Request.pdf; Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No.
7,029,913, July 18, 2006, Daniel B. Ravicher, http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/warfstemcell
/913Request.pdf.
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While not unusual as a patent litigation strategy among corporations, it was rare to
find a consumer group litigating a patent on the basis of its obviousness. The idea
for the reexamination came from Dr. Jeanne Loring, Director of the Center for
Regenerative Medicine at The Scripps Research Institute, when she learned that
WARF expected the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM)110 to
pay licensing and royalty fees.111 She recounted:
I was already working on deriving human ES cell lines, as were several of
my colleagues in the field, when I learned about the patents, and I began
to worry about what impact this monopoly would have. My concern
about the patents grew as it became clear that the patent holder intended
to exploit its monopoly, charging for licences to use human ES cells. I
started seriously researching patents and came across an article about
Dan Ravicher, an attorney who had founded the Public Patent
Foundation in New York to challenge patents that threatened the public
interest. I called him for advice, and within a month he had become my
teacher and partner in the challenge to the patents that we brought in the
summer of 2006.112
Ravicher, an experienced attorney, had a track record of corporate
concessions and favorable initial rulings from the U.S.P.T.O. against major patents
including Pfizer’s Lipitor patent and Microsoft’s FAT file system patent.113 Their
case was supplemented by an expert scientific declaration of support stating:
Dr. Thomson deserved the recognition he received for his work relating
to human embryonic stem cells because he was able to get the human
embryos and financial support needed for such work. He did not,
however, make a scientific advance that was surprising to those of us
with skill in the art. It was his ability to secure those extremely limited
resources that provided him the ability to achieve his accomplishment.
Had I or any other stem cell scientist been given human embryos and
sufficient funding, we could have made the same accomplishment,
because the science required to isolate and maintain human embryonic
110. CIRM is a nonprofit designed to give $3 billion of California tax revenues in the form of
grants for California-based stem cell research established as a result of a statewide vote on
Proposition 71, the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. The CIRM has awarded over
$1 billion in grants since 2006, more than half of which focus on hESCs.
111. Erika Check, Patenting the Obvious?, 447 NATURE 16 (2007); Cal. Health & Safety Code §
125291.30 (West 2004).
112. Jeanne F. Loring, A Patent Challenge for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, NATURE
REPORTS STEM CELLS, Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.nature.com/stemcells/2007/0711/071108
/full/stemcells.2007.113.html.
113. Daniel Ravicher founded PUBPAT in 2003 to challenge patents that he deemed to be
restrictive of public freedom. On April 15, 2004, PUBPAT filed a formal request to revoke the patent
on Microsoft’s FAT File System. (U.S. Patent 5,579,517). On September 30, 2004, the USPTO
rejected Microsoft’s patent as written, requiring Microsoft to narrow its claims. Similarly, on
September 14, 2004, PUBPAT filed a formal request to revoke Pfizer’s patent on Lipitor (U.S. Patent
5,969,156). The patent was rejected as written on June 29, 2005, causing Pfizer to relinquish much of
its broad claim language.
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stem cells was obvious at the time.114
The argument that all three patents should be re-examined and rejected was
based on the notion that “each of the claims of [the relevant patents] are invalid
for being anticipated by Williams and for being obvious in light of Robertson
1983,115 Robertson 1987,116 and Piedrahita117.”118 Essentially, prior art had already
described the cell lines and methods claimed in the WARF patents. It is important
to note that while Piedrahita was used in the prosecution of U.S. Patent
Application 08/376,327 and was therefore prior art with respect to its CIP
(5,843,780), Piedrahita could be used in a reexamination of U.S. Patent 5,843,780
because it “was not applied directly to the rejection of the present claims.”119 On
September 29, 2006, the USPTO agreed to re-examine all three patents.120
Taking action not in the courts, not even in a legal setting, WARF reacted to
the U.S.P.T.O. decision by shaping their behavior towards the scientific
community: they voluntarily implemented several new, more generous licensing
policies on January 23, 2007.121 For the first time, WARF allowed firms “to
sponsor research at an academic or nonprofit institution without a license,
regardless of the location and regardless of the IP rights passing from the research
institutions the company.”122 This gave firms their first opportunity to perform
research on hESCs without making a significant investment. In addition, WARF
reduced the fee for obtaining a human ESC line from $5,000 to $500, mitigating
the financial barrier to researching human ESCs.123 WARF also clarified that the
CIRM did “not require a license agreement from WARF” nor did WARF expect
any remittance for payments made to the CIRM by grantees.124
On March 30, 2007, the U.S.P.T.O. preliminarily rejected 5,843,780,

114. Jeanne F. Loring, Declaration of Dr. Jeanne F. Loring, Ph.D. in Support of FTCR and PUBPAT
Requests, July 18, 2006, http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/warfstemcell/LoringDeclarations.pdf.
115. TERATOCARCINOMA STEM CELLS 647–83 (Lee M. Silver et al. eds., 1983).
116. TERATOCARCINOMAS AND EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS, A PRACTICAL APPROACH 71–
112 (Elizabeth J. Robertson ed., 1987).
117. Piedrahita et al., supra note 71.
118. Request for Ex Parte Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780, July 18, 2006, Daniel B.
Ravicher, http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/warfstemcell/780Request.pdf; see also U.S. Patent No.
5,166,065 (issued Nov. 24, 1992).
119. Ex Parte Reexamination Communication Transmittal Form, U.S. Patent Application No.
90/008,102, Mar. 30, 2007, Padmashri Ponnaluri.
120. Reexamination: Granting of Request, U.S. Patent Application No. 90/008,139, Sept. 29, 2006,
Bennett M. Celsa; Reexamination: Granting of Request, U.S. Patent Application No. 95/000,154, Sept. 29,
2006, Gary L. Kunz; Ponnaluri, supra note 119.
121. Press Release, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Changes Stem Cell Policies to Encourage
Greater Academic, Industry Collaboration, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.warf.org/news/news.jsp?news_id=209.
122. Id.
123. Alisa Opar, U.S. Tosses Out Patents on Three Wisconsin Stem Cell Lines, 13 NAT. MED. 519
(2007); Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, supra note 121.
124. WISCONSIN ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 121.
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6,200,806, and 7,029,913.125 Although these rejections seem to represent three
distinct reexamination rulings, the patents were reexamined by a single team of
four examiners and each case was assigned to three out of the four. The examiners
found that “the method of isolating ES cells in the present claim method is the
exact same process taught by [the] Robertson references and [the] Piedrahita
reference.”126 They also found that “Williams et al. [taught] that the embryos used
may be isolated from animals including humans (primate).”127 Therefore, the
examiners concluded that “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention
was made would have been motivated to combine the teachings of [the]
Robertson references, [and the] Piedrahita reference with the teachings of
Williams et al such that pluripotent ES cells from humans (primate) [could have
been] isolated.”128 The examiners even went beyond the references supplied by
Ravicher and cited U.S. Patent 5,690,926 which claimed “pluripotential stem cells
which can . . . be maintained on feeder layers for at least 20 passages or
indefinitely,” seemingly making the duration clause in Claim 1 of with U.S. Patent
7,029,913 obvious.129 After developing the above conclusions, the examiners
preliminarily rejected U.S. Patents 5,843,780, 6,200,806, and 7,029,913 as obvious
to someone with “ordinary skill in the art.”130
WARF amended each of these patents on May 30, 2007, and continued the
reexamination process.131 It amended U.S. Patents 5,843,780 and 6,200,806 by
modifying claim 1 “to recite that the cells are derived from a pre-implantation
embryo,” adding the qualifier “capable of proliferation for over one year” to ESCs
in Claims 9 and 11, and introducing a new independent Claim 12 along with its
dependent Claims 13 and 14 to further specify differences between isolating
mouse and human ESCs.132 WARF also made the same modification to Claim 1 in
U.S. patent 7,029,913 as it did in the previous two patents.133 Beyond
straightforward claim recommendations, WARF engaged the examiner’s rejection

125. Ex Parte Reexamination Communication Transmittal Form, U.S. Patent Application No.
90/008,139, Mar. 30, 2007, Bennett M. Celsa et al.; Inter Partes Reexamination Communication Transmittal
Form, U.S. Patent Application No. 95/000,154, Mar. 30, 2007, Gary L. Kunz et al.; Ex Parte
Reexamination Communication Transmittal Form, U.S. Patent Application No. 90/008,102, Mar. 30, 2007,
Padmashri Ponnaluri et al..
126. Ponnaluri et al., supra note 119.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Kunz et al., supra note 125; U.S. Patent No. 5,690,926 (filed Nov. 25, 1997).
130. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2009).
131. Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment, U.S. Patent Application No.
90/008,102, May 30, 2007, Katherine R. Doyle et al., [hereinafter Doyle, ‘102]; Applicant
Arguments/Remarks Made in an Amendment, U.S. Patent Application No. 90/008,139, May 30, 2007,
Katherine R. Doyle et al., [hereinafter Doyle, ‘139]; Applicant Arguments/Remarks Made in an
Amendment, U.S. Patent Application No. 95/000,154, May 30, 2007, Kathryn R. Doyle et al.
[hereinafter Doyle, ‘154].
132. Doyle, ‘102, supra note 131; Doyle, ‘139, supra note 131.
133. Doyle, ‘154, supra note 131.
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arguments through claim interpretation and relevant literature as well as turning to
the scientific literature to provide strong support for the novel and nonobvious
nature of the hESC isolation.134 Indeed, they pointed out and supported using
written statements from other scientists that “for nearly two decades from the
discovery of mouse ES cells, others repeatedly tried and failed to isolate nonmurine ES cells, particularly primate/human ES cell lines.”135 WARF also argued
that the purification methods cited in Robertson’s136 and Piedrahita’s137 work had
only been applied to a handful of mammals and the techniques varied
unpredictably across species.138 In fact, they argued that, even though Williams
proposed the isolation of human ESCs in his scientific paper, neither he nor
others were able to extend his technique beyond mice for a period of time.139
Turning again to the system of scientific review and publication to support their
arguments, the lawyers note that “[t]he level of acclaim in the art for Dr.
Thomson’s invention bears witness to the fact that the isolation of
primate/human ES cells represented true innovation that was not simply a small
step in embryonic stem cell research.”140 As the response to the office action
outlines, Thomson had been the recipient of a number of awards by the scientific
community establishing the importance and transformational nature of his
scientific work including:
 The 2005 American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) “Milestones of Science” recognition.
 The 2006 American Association for Laboratory Animal Science
Nathan R. Brewer Scientific Achievement Award for discoveries in
the field of embryonic stem cells.
 The 1999 Golden Plate Award by the American Academy of
Achievement in 1999 “recent breakthrough in culturing human
embryonic stem cells outside the body.”
 The 2004 American College of Veterinary Pathologists Outstanding
Achievement Award, for his work with embryonic stem cells.141
Based on these repeated forms of validation for nonobvious and
groundbreaking work from the scientific community, the examiner found that the
“the prior art of record fails to disclose [a] replicating in vitro cell culture of
human embryonic stem cells derived from a pre-implantation embryo” and that

134. Doyle, ‘102, supra note 131; Doyle, ‘139, supra note 131; Doyle, ‘154, supra note 131.
135. Doyle, ‘139, supra note 131.
136. Robertson (1983), supra note 115; Robertson (1987), supra note 116.
137. Piedrahita et al., supra note 71.
138. Doyle, supra note 131.
139. See Robert A. Cherny et al., Strategies for the Isolation and Characterization of Bovine Embryonic
Stem Cells, 6 REPROD. FERTIL. DEV. 569 (1994); U.S. Patent No. 5,166,065 (issued Nov. 24, 1992).
140. Doyle, ‘102, supra note 131, at 5.
141. Id. at 6–7.
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the preponderance of the evidence of record is quite clear that the
instantly claimed replicating in vitro culture of human embryonic stem
cells are not obvious because of the highly complex and unpredictable
nature of the art of isolating and maintaining embryonic stem cells
leading to lack of a reasonable expectation of success. Without a
reasonable expectation of success, there can be no prima facie case for
obviousness.142
In this regard the scientific literature and the fanfare that greeted Thomson’s
research when it was published in Science in 1998 provided strong evidence to
counter the claim of obviousness, certainly within the scientific community.143 As
a result of evidence disclosed and adjudicated in the scientific literature rather than
the patent system, the examiner withdrew his rejections on the claims of U.S.
Patent 7,029,913 and used similar reasoning to restore the other two patents.144
The consumer group had a right to appeal the reexamination of U.S. Patent
7,029,913 to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) through their
inter partes status, a right they exercised on June 20, 2008.145 A decision was
reached by the BPAI on April 28, 2010, that reversed the examiner in full,
potentially invalidating U.S. Patent 7,029,913.146 The BPAI first tackled the
question of “whether Williams described and enabled human embryonic stem cells
derived from a pre-implantation embryo.”147 Based on the fact that Williams
proposed both the existence of human ESCs and provided two methods for their
purification—in essence an experimental path that someone who is of “ordinary
skill in the art” could follow to attempt to isolate human ESCs—the BPAI
concluded that “Williams described and enabled human embryonic stem cells
derived from a pre-implantation embryo, anticipating the subject matter of claim
1.”148 A very distinct conclusion from the one made by the scientific community
who first rewarded Thomson’s team with his Science publication, this anticipation

142. Inter Partes Reexamination: Detailed Action: Action Closing Prosecution, U.S. Patent Application
No. 95/000,154, Feb. 25, 2008, Bennett M. Celsa et al.
143. Doyle, ‘102, supra note 131; Doyle, ‘139, supra note 131; Doyle, ‘154, supra note 131.
144. Inter Partes Reexamination: Detailed Action: Action Closing Prosecution, U.S. Patent Application
No. 95/000,154, Feb. 25, 2008, Bennett M. Celsa et al; Reexamination: Reasons for
Patentability/Confirmation, U.S. Patent Application No. 90/008,139, Mar. 5, 2008, Bennett M. Celsa et
al; Reexamination: Reasons for Patentability/Confirmation, U.S. Patent Application No. 90/008,102, Mar. 5,
2008, Padmashri Ponnaluri et al. It is important to recognize that the reexaminations of U.S. Patents
5,843,780 and 6200806 were ex parte whereas the reexamination of U.S. Patent 7,029,913 was inter
partes. Once the examiners ruled on the ex parte cases, the FTCP had no recourse until “a substantial
new question of patentability” arose either through discovery of new prior art or a change in the
relevant case law. See 35 U.S.C. § 302; 35 U.S.C. § 303.
145. The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation, U.S. Patent Application No. 95/000,154, Apr. 28, 2010, Richard M. Lebovitz et al.; 35
U.S.C. § 315 (2009).
146. Lebovitz et al., supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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invalidates the claim by making it obvious. The BPAI then examined “whether
Hogan’s description of the ES cells derived from germ cells anticipated and
claimed the ES cells derived from a pre-implantation embryo.”149 The Board
upheld the examiners withdrawal in this case because they found structural
differences between ESCs and ESGs and since ESGs cannot transform into
ESCs, there was “no evidence that Hogan’s embryonic stem cells could be
converted into ES cells derived from a pre-implantation embryo.”150
In their final statement, the BPAI then criticized the examiners’ threshold for
“obviousness,” stating that having a “reasonable expectation of success” is far
more stringent that the “obvious to try” threshold set by the Supreme Court.151 In
1995, the effective filing date of U.S. Patent 7,029,913, isolating human ESCs
would certainly have been “obvious to try.”
The decision, as it stood in 2010, countered the received wisdom of the
scientific community which has made no attempt to regard the Thomson
publication as anything other than a scientific landmark, even while disagreeing
with and protesting the execution of the licensing rights by WARF.152 Indeed, this
view in the scientific community was captured as early as 1999 with the
announcement in Science that hESCs were the “Breakthrough of the Year,”
commenting that
in a technological breakthrough that triggered a burst of research and a
whirlwind of ethical debate, two teams of researchers announced that
they had managed to prolong the moment of cellular youth. They kept
embryonic and fetal human cells at their maximum potential, ready to be
steered into becoming any cell in the body.153
It is important to note that the patent decision is not final; WARF can either
amend its claims, gather new evidence to reopen patent prosecution, or request a
rehearing with the BPAI to address its new rejection claims.154 In light of the
disagreement between the scientific community and the patent system, it would
not be surprising if the decision remained controversial.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Lebovitz et al., supra note 145.
152. Thomson also received numerous awards from outside the scientific community
including in 2001, a profile in TIME magazine as one of the doctors “who [is] changing our world.”
America’s Best Science & Medicine, TIME, August 20, 2001, at cover. Calling him “The man who brought
you stem cells,” TIME recognized Thomson as the scientist who had first isolated human embryonic
stem cells. Thomson was also inducted into the Biotech Hall of Fame in 2001 for work that had “set
the stage for a revolution in medicine and science.” Biotech Recognizes the Year’s Best, BURRILL &
COMPANY (Oct. 11, 2001) http://www.burrillandco.com/news-263-Biotech_Recognizes_the _Years
_Best.html.
153. Gretchen Vogel, Breakthrough of the Year: Capturing the Promise of Youth, 286 SCIENCE 2238
(1999).
154. Lebovitz et al., supra note 145.
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C. Publications & Patents in HIV-AIDS
The discovery of the HIV-AIDs virus provides a canonical example of the
tight coupling between the patent system and the scientific community with its
complexity of norms, practices, and modes of self-governance and one in which
the coupling is more synchronous than the stem cell case. The interaction was
initiated by the scientific discoveries made and patents filed by Dr. Robert Gallo
of the United States and Dr. Luc Montagnier of France from 1983 to 1984. Prior
to that time on June 5, 1981, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) published an article in its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report concerning
the deaths of five previously healthy men to Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
(PCP).155 While, at the time, this was regarded as an epidemiological curiosity, as
PCP had historically affected only the most immunocompromised individuals, we
now know this marked the beginning of the AIDS epidemic. By August 1982, just
15 months later, there had been 470 documented cases and 184 AIDS-related
deaths.156 This statistic presented a clear and growing need for the biomedical
research community to identify the cause of AIDS.157 While HIV was discovered
to be the cause of AIDS less than a year later, an international debate over the
discovery lay unresolved for nearly a decade and in its resolution not only the
matter of scientific priority was adjudicated, but also patent ownership and
validity.158
Dr. Robert Gallo, then chief of the Laboratory of Tumor Cell Biology at the
National Cancer Institute, was an expert in retrovirology. In the early 1980s, his
group had isolated the first two human retroviruses, human T-cell leukemia virus–
1 (HTLV–1) and human T-cell leukemia virus–2 (HTLV-2).159 It was no surprise
then that Dr. Gallo was the first to notice similarities between the transmission,
cellular pathology, and epidemiological origins of AIDS and HTLV-1,
observations that led him to hypothesize that AIDS was caused by a retrovirus
thought to be a lymphotropic retrovirus found in human T-cell cultures.160 While
his initial experiments linking HTLV-1 to AIDS were unsuccessful, and therefore
unpublished, his retrovirus theory spread quickly throughout the research
community.161 By the end of 1982, Dr. Luc Montagnier, then head of the Viral
155. Michael S. Gottleib et al., Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 250 (1981).
156. Jean L. Marx, New Disease Baffles Medical Community, 217 SCIENCE 618 (1982).
157. Id. at 621.
158. Daniel S. Greenberg, Resounding Echoes of Gallo Case, 345 LANCET 639 (1995).
159. Vaniambadi S. Kalyanaraman et al., A New Subtype of Human T-cell Leukemia Virus
(HTLV-II) Associated with a T-cell Variant of Hairy Cell Leukemia, 218 SCIENCE 571 (1982); Bernard J.
Poiesz et al., Detection and Isolation of Type C Retrovirus Particles from Fresh and Cultured Lymphocytes of a
Patient with Cutaneous T-cell Lymphoma, 77 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCIENCE 7415 (1980).
160. Robert C. Gallo, Historical Essay: The Early Years of HIV/AIDS, 298 SCIENCE 1728
(2002).
161. Id.; Luc Montagnier, Historical Essay: A History of HIV Discovery, 298 SCIENCE 1727
(2002).
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Oncology group at the Pasteur Institute, had decided to test Dr. Gallo’s
hypothesis.162
Dr. Montagnier was advantageously positioned to test Dr. Gallo’s hypothesis
because his Viral Oncology group had been using Interleukin-2 (also discovered
by Gallo) to culture T lymphocytes from cancer patients for years.163 This allowed
Dr. Montagnier and his colleagues to seek out lymphotropic retroviruses in human
T-cell cultures which they began doing on January 3, 1983.164 By February 1983,
the French group had isolated a novel T-lymphotropic retrovirus, which they later
named Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus (LAV).165 This discovery was
published alongside similar, but less successful, efforts from Dr. Gallo’s group166
and Dr. Myron Essex’s group167 at Harvard University in May of the same year.168
Further research by Montagnier’s group elucidated a second, more aggressive class
of retroviruses, Immune Deficiency Associated Viruses (IDAVs).169 During the
summer and fall of 1983, acting in response to a request of Gallo’s from April 25,
1983, Montagnier sent what he thought were LAV samples under the condition
that the samples would not be used for commercial or industrial purposes.170
However, it was later discovered that these samples were actually heavily
contaminated—a fact that would add significant confusion to the ensuing legal
and political turmoil.171
By August 1983, Montagnier’s group had developed a diagnostic test against
retroviral antibodies in the bloodstream using a LAV sample similarly and
unknowingly contaminated with LAI.172 Subsequently, the group filed a patent
application for this test in the United Kingdom on September 15, 1983, under
Patent Application Number No. 8,324,800 and in the United States on December

162. Id.
163. Id.; Doris Anne Morgan et al., Selective in Vitro Growth of T Lymphocytes from Normal Human
Bone Marrows, 193 SCIENCE 1007 (1976).
164. Montagnier, supra note 161.
165. Françoise Barré-Sinoussi et al., Isolation of a T-lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 868 (1983).
166. Edward P. Gelmann et al., Proviral DNA of a Retrovirus, Human T-cell Leukemia Virus, in
Two Patients with AIDS, 220 SCIENCE 862 (1983).
167. Myron Essex et al., Antibodies to Cell Membrane Antigens Associated with Human T-cell
Leukemia Virus in Patients with AIDS, 220 SCIENCE 859 (1983).
168. See Stanley B. Prusiner, Historical Essay: Discovering the Cause of AIDS, 298 SCIENCE 1726
(2002).
169. Gallo, supra note 160; Montagnier, supra note 161.
170. Institut Pasteur v. U.S., 10 Cl. Ct. 304 (1986), rev’d, 814 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, No. 730-85C (Cl. Ct. Dec. 4, 1987); Howard L. Singer, Institut Pasteur v. U.S.:
The AIDS Patent Dispute, the Contract Disputes Act and the International Exchange of Scientific Data. 15 AM.
J.L. & MED. 439 (1989).
171. Simon Wain-Hobson, LAV Revisited: Origins of the Early HIV-1 Isolates from Institut Pasteur,
252 SCIENCE 961 (1991).
172. Catalina Norman, Patent Dispute Divides AIDS Researchers, 230 SCIENCE 640 (1985); WainHobson, supra note 171.
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5, 1983, under Application No. 558,109.173 In March 1984, Gallo’s group
definitively showed that AIDS was caused by a retrovirus using the same
LAV/LAI contaminated strain as Montagnier’s group, although under the
impression they were using their own previously isolated HTLV-III strain.174 Like
Montagnier’s group, they filed a patent application for an AIDS diagnostic kit
using HTLV-III (unknowingly contaminated with LAI) on April 23, 1984, before
publishing their work in Science (in other words their disclosure strategy was a
patent-paper pair).175 Unlike Montagnier’s group whose application was delayed
during review, Gallo’s patent application was approved and the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) was issued U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 on May
28, 1985.176 Gallo’s patent had four independent claims: Claim 1 described a
method for detecting AIDS-specific antibodies while Claims 7, 9, and 10
described specific implementations of a diagnostic test kit for AIDS based on
these antibodies.177 Specifically,
1. A method for the detection of antibodies which specifically bind to
antigenic sites of the Human T-cell Leukemia Virus-III (HTLV-III) virion in
samples of the body fluids of patients with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) or risk of AIDS (pre-AIDS) which comprises contacting
HTLV-III or fractions thereof said sample with antibodies from human sera
taken from AIDS patients and measuring the formation of antigen-antibody
complexes by strip radioimmunoassay based on Western Blot technique or
ELISA (an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) or indirect
immunofluorescent assay.
7. A diagnostic test kit for detection of AIDS specific antibodies comprising
a compartmented enclosure containing multiwell plates which are coated
with HTLV-III and ELISA materials for enzyme detection consisting of
normal goat serum and peroxidase, labeled goat antihuman IgG and a color
change indicator consisting of orthophenylene diamine and hydrogen
peroxide in phosphate citrate buffer.
9. A diagnostic AIDS specific test kit for detecting AIDS specific antibodies
using the Western Blot technique comprising a container, a cover, and
therein containing a nitrocellulose sheet and a polyacrylamide slab gel and
sodium dodecylsulfate, and additionally surfactants as well as pH modifiers
and bovine serum albumin and the Fab fragment of normal human IgG, and
Western Blot analysis container which contains a supply of dilute normal
173. Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 306.
174. Robert C. Gallo et al., Frequent Detection and Isolation of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III)
from Patients with AIDS and at Risk for AIDS, 224 SCIENCE 500 (1984); Norman, supra note 172;
Mikulas Popovic et al., Detection, Isolation, and Continuous Production of Cytopathic Retroviruses (HTLV-III)
from Patients with AIDS and Pre-AIDS, 224 SCIENCE 497 (1984); Mangalasseril Sarngadharan et al.,
Antibodies Reactive with Human T-lymphotropic Retroviruses (HTLV-III) in the Serum of Patients with AIDS,
224 SCIENCE 506 (1984); Jorg Schupbach, Serological Analysis of a Subgroup of Human T-lymphotropic
Retroviruses (HTLV-III) Associated with AIDS, 224 SCIENCE 503 (1984).
175. Wain-Hobson, supra note 171.
176. U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 (filed April 23, 1984) [hereinafter referred to as the ‘113
Patent]; Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 306.
177. Id.
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goat serum and I.sup.125 labeled goat antihuman immonoglobulin and a
source of HTLV-III.
10. An AIDS specific test kit for detecting antibodies using the indirect
immunofluorescence assay comprising a compartmental container, human
test serum containing HTLV-III, phosphate buffered saline, and fluoresceinconjugated goat antiserum IgG.178
As one would expect, these claims closely mirrored those established in
Gallo’s 1984 Science papers. Specifically, Gallo describes “an immunological
screening of serum samples from patients with AIDS and pre-AIDS and from
individuals at increased risk for AIDS” using “autoradiography after incubation of
. . . strips” prepared by either ELISA or “by SDS-polyacrylamide gel
electrophoresis and transferred to a nitrocellulose sheet by the electrophoretic
blotting (Western) technique.”179 While less important than the independent
claims, the dependent claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 also closely matched
Gallo’s findings. For example, Claim 3 is “the method according to claim 1
wherein a 41,000 m.w. fraction of HTLV-III is utilized.”180
In response to accusations by the Pasteur Institute that the U.S. Patent
Office rushed Gallo’s patent through the approval process while delaying
Montagnier’s patent, the U.S. Patent Office claimed that “Pasteur had the
misfortune of having their patent application processed by an extremely busy
office whereas the U.S. had the good fortune of having its applications assigned to
an office with a lighter work load.”181 As a result of the dispute, by August 1985,
the Pasteur Institute initiated a dialogue with HHS regarding the patent situation.
Dr. Raymond Dedonder, then director of the Pasteur Institute, made several
demands: that the Pasteur Institute be named a coholder on the patent,
acknowledgment that Montagnier’s group was the first to discover HIV and apply
for the diagnostic patent, and a guarantee that Genetic Systems Corporation (the
company that held the Pasteur license to the AIDS diagnostic) be allowed in the
U.S. market without infringing on the U.S. government’s patent.182 In other
words, in adjudicating the claim over patent priority and ownership, the French
scientists invoked a determination of priority generated in the Republic of Science
and grounded in disclosure in a scientific publication. HHS replied to Dedonder
on August 20, 1985, requesting documentation supporting his demands in the
following letter:

This letter is in the spirit of affirming our resolution and our common
goal in working together with you and the Pasteur Institut in overcoming
AIDS. At our meeting of August 7, and your meeting of August 6, with
178. Id.
179. Popovic et al., supra note 174.
180. ‘113 Patent, supra note 176.
181. Singer, supra note 170 at 445 n.36.
182. Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 306; Norman, supra note 176; Catalina Norman, AIDS Priority
Fight Goes to Court, 231 SCIENCE 11 (1986).
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members of the department, a number of extremely serious
representations were made. We would appreciate your providing us with
the representations and supporting documentation in as much detail as
you choose, in writing, so that we may consider them on a timely basis
with respect to your September 6 time frame. We can assure you that
consideration will be thorough and fair to all concerned.183
Despite Dedonder’s same-day reply, the HHS determined that Dedonder’s
claims were unjustifiable and that patent remained valid as described in their
September 6, 1985, letter:
This letter refers to your discussions with me and staff of the Department
on August 6 and 7 and the material you subsequently submitted to me in
support of your position on the Institut Pasteur applications for a patent
on a diagnostic test for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
antibodies . . . .
. . .We have carefully reviewed the written material you furnished and the
oral representations made during your visit to the Department. Based on
that information and our own review of the laboratory records and other
documents relating to this matter, we can find no basis to support your
position that U.S. Patent No. 4,520,113 is invalid or that the actions you
requested be taken by the Department are warranted . . . .
. . .Nevertheless, we are concerned that this issue not stand in the way of
further cooperation between this Department and the Institut Pasteur, as
well as with research scientists throughout the world, towards the cure
and prevention of this dreaded disease. We stand ready to discuss these
and related matters with you and to review any other materials you may
wish to submit relating to this issue.184
As a result, the Pasteur Institute filed suit against the United States in the
U.S. Claims Court on December 12, 1985 (Institut Pasteur v. The United States 1986).
The Pasteur Institute’s central claim was that Dr. Gallo’s group used samples
Montagnier’s group had sent in the development of the American diagnostic
system (Institut Pasteur v. The United States 1986). This use breached the contract
signed by Dr. Mikulas Popovic, a researcher in Gallo’s group, on September 23,
1983, expressly forbidding the use of Montagnier’s samples for commercial or
industrial purposes.185 As relief, the Pasteur Institute sought acknowledgment that
183. Letter from C. McClain Haddow to Dr. Raymond Dedonder (Aug. 20, 1985) (noted in
Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 307).
184. Id.
185. Part of this agreement is reproduced below:
Virus LAV1 produced by human T-lymphocytes n degrees I-232 deposited on July 15th,
1983 at the C.N.C.M. The virus LAV1 will be available subject to acceptance of the three
following conditions:
1) The virus will be used by the recipient himself, exclusively, and only for the
following research purposes (fill in): a) biological; b) immunological and c) nucleic acid studies.
2) It will not be used for any industrial purpose without the prior written consent of
the Director of the Pasteur Institute.
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Montagnier’s group was the first to discover the retroviral cause of AIDS, records
of HHS’s profits and royalties from the AIDS diagnostic, all future royalties from
the AIDS diagnostic, and over one million dollars in damages beyond interest and
legal fees.186 The court found that the case fell under the Contract Disputes Act
(CDA) and since the Pasteur Institute failed to submit a certified damaged claim
“to an HHS contracting officer and therefore did not obtain a decision or failure
to decide” from the HHS regarding that claim, a prerequisite to claims court
jurisdiction, as required by the CDA, the case was dismissed on May 22, 1986.187
The Pasteur Institute appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit who reversed and remanded the claims court decision, holding
that the breach of contract claim should not have been dismissed solely due to
failure to comply with the procedures outlined in the CDA.188
In a decision that was to reaffirm the intertwined systems of publication and
patenting, three weeks after the Appeals decision in March 1987, President Reagan
of the United States and President Chirac of France announced a settlement in the
case. It allocated each side forty percent of the future royalties, and gave twenty
percent to the World AIDS Foundation. However, this was not simply a patent
settlement; the decision also recognized Montagnier and Gallo as codiscoverers of
the retrovirus that causes AIDS, and renamed the retrovirus in question HIV.189
By linking the ownership of the patent (more specifically claims on returns from
the patent) to claims on scientific priority, the two leaders recognized the
importance of the scientific community in adjudicating the production of new
knowledge. The creation of this settlement was due in large part to Dr. Jonas
Salk,190 who not only created and funded the World AIDS Foundation through
the agreement but also facilitated correspondence between Gallo and Montagnier
in the months leading up to the settlement.191 This correspondence allowed the

3) The recipient agrees not to disseminate the virus in any form (to companies or
other scientists) without the prior written authorization of the Director of the Pasteur
Institute.
The recipient is also informed that the virus LAV1 may constitute a potential biohazard.
I AGREE TO ACCEPT two samples of virus LAV1 (Mkt-1B and JBB LAV) and anti-interferon
sheep serum (2ml) UNDER THE CONDITIONS LISTED ABOVE.
DATE September 23, 1983
NAME Dr. Mikulas Popovic
Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 306.
186. Id. at 308.
187. Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C §§ 601–605 (1982); Institut Pasteur, 10 Cl. Ct. at 311.
188. Pasteur v. U.S., 814 F. 2d 624, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
189. Colin Macilwain, France Wins Larger Share of Patent Royalties After AIDS Test Dispute, 370
NATURE 85 (1994); Singer, supra note 170.
190. Salk was the discoverer of the polio vaccine and then Director of the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies. He believed “it was not in the best interest of either science or the public to have
[the dispute] linger” as it was “an unhealthy state for all concerned.” Medicine: Yalta of AIDS, TIME,
Apr. 13, 1987.
191. Charles Marwick, Cooler Heads (of State) Prevail. . . Voila, French-American HIV Test Accord,
258 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 3482 (1987).
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three scientists to develop a chronology of AIDS research and reach the
agreement that the two research groups codiscovered HIV, a scientific dispute
whose resolution was prerequisite to the broader legal agreement that underscores
the intertwined institutions of publishing and patenting particularly for research
whose intellectual foundations also has strong commercial consequences.192
Salk’s efforts seemingly put an end to a transatlantic feud; the two men
eventually coauthored the aforementioned chronology of AIDS research.193
However, in 1990, controversy returned to Dr. Gallo when an investigative
reporter named John Crewdson wrote a scathing piece in the Chicago Tribune
alleging that Gallo’s group had intentionally stolen Dr. Montagnier’s retroviral
strains for commercial purposes.194 What followed was a complex series of
investigations by the NIH’s Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI) into Gallo’s
research during the critical years of 1983 and 1984 as ordered by Representative
John Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan.195 In addition, the National Academy of
Sciences and the Institute of Medicine nominated a panel of “expert but
disinterested parties” at the NIH’s request, led by Yale University biochemist
Professor Frederic Richards, to serve as an advisory body to the OSI
investigation.196 In late 1993, with considerable dissention among the various
involved parties, the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) dropped Gallo’s case
because it felt it could not meet the burden of proof.197 Although the four-year
investigation into Dr. Gallo failed to find him responsible for misconduct, it did
unequivocally bring out the fact that he used Montagnier’s retroviral strains to
perform many of his seminal experiments.198
As much of the American claim to the diagnostic patent rested on the notion
that Gallo had developed the American diagnostic test without the use of French
retroviral strains, those interested in property rights defined within the patent
system once again looked to the scientific community for guidance. The Pasteur
Institute was on the verge of reopening litigation with the United States
government if the royalties were not adjusted accordingly.199 In July 1994, the
NIH settled before a suit was even filed and the Pasteur Institute secured sixty
percent of future AIDS diagnostic royalties, leaving twenty percent each for the
HHS and World AIDS Foundation.200 The method of resolution in this case is
192. Id.
193. Robert C. Gallo & Luc Montagnier, The Chronology of AIDS Research, 326 NATURE 435
(1987).
194. Jon Cohen & Martin Enserink, Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine: HIV, HPV Researchers
Honored, but One Scientist Is Left Out, 322 SCIENCE 174 (2008).
195. Barbara J. Culliton, Inside the Gallo Probe, 248 SCIENCE 1494 (1990).
196. Id.
197. Christopher Anderson, ORI Drops Gallo Case in Legal Dispute, 262 SCIENCE 981 (1993).
198. Id.; Jon Cohen, Stormy Weather Ahead for OSI’s Gallo Report, 255 SCIENCE 914 (1992); Jon
Cohen, HHS: Gallo Guilty of Misconduct, 259 SCIENCE 168 (1993).
199. Macilwain, supra note 189.
200. Id.
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remarkable as it was initiated by, and reflected, a change in the (never formalized)
view of the scientific community regarding publication (rather than patent) priority
and claims of legitimacy. Beyond that, this change was negotiated by leaders of
national scientific institutions—by scientists, not lawyers.201 Together, these
resolution mechanisms demonstrate that the underlying science is central to the
political and economic levers that traditionally control patent litigation.202
III. CONCLUSIONS
In common discourse regarding the role of commercial pressures and, in
particular, intellectual property protection on scientific research, it is
commonplace to assume that scientific practices are impacted by commercial ones
rather than the other way around. But, in fact, the two are interrelated. They share
common features and also interact with one another, shaping the practice of law
as well as the practice of science.
This paper has outlined the common features between the legal institution of
patent protection and also the institution often referred to as the Republic of
Science. Both are institutions designed to reward the generation of ideas and
innovations as well as provide a means to promote disclosure and wider
dissemination. Each operates with similar features including excludable rights
(prevention of commercialization by patents and security of priority and
attribution by science), disclosure requirements (to obtain the rewards from each
system requires a form of publication of the ideas), and a minimum inventive step
(requiring novelty and significance in order to generate a reward). In addition, each
shares various points of discretion that can evolve dynamically as well as be
tailored for specific environmental circumstances.
Beyond these common features, and perhaps because of them, the two
institutions interact in ways that are complementary. This is especially true with
regard to their dual aims of promoting disclosure and assigning priority. Both
conceptually and in our specific examples, we demonstrate that the disclosure
requirements in one system can enable additional disclosures in the other, but this
also carries the consequence that stringent requirements in one system may cause
innovators to opt out of both. This also means that reforms to enhance openness

201. Id.
202. While the patent dispute between the United States and France was resolved, there
continues to be significant uncertainty as to whether Gallo knowingly used Montagnier’s retroviral
strains. Although the two researchers seem to have buried the hatchet, as demonstrated in their
amicable coauthorship in 2002, the Nobel Assembly had the last word on the controversy: fourteen
years after the final settlement, Montagnier and his colleague Dr. Barré-Sinoussi were each awarded a
quarter of the 2008 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for their “discovery of the human
immunodeficiency virus.” See Cohen & Enserink, supra note 194. Notably, Gallo was not only absent
from the podium, but the press release as well. See The Nobel Assembly, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine 2008, Press Release, Oct. 6, 2008, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates
/2008/press.html.
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and disclosure in one system may well impact the operation of the other. More
subtly, we propose and document with two comprehensive examples—the
interrelationship of the patent system and the Republic of Science—beyond
disclosure. We demonstrate that the adjudication of claims of novelty, analysis of
priority, and the evaluation of usefulness within the Republic of Science have a
critical impact on decisions made ostensibly within the patent system. Thus, as we
consider the patent crisis, and the role of the courts in solving it, we must consider
the surprising influence of the scientific community in shaping legal practice.

